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ABSTRACT
Airbnb, an online marketplace for accommodations, has experi-
enced a staggering growth accompanied by intense debates and
scattered regulations around the world. Current discourses, how-
ever, are largely focused on opinions rather than empirical evi-
dences. Here, we aim to bridge this gap by presenting the first
large-scale measurement study on Airbnb, using a crawled data set
containing 2.3 million listings, 1.3 million hosts, and 19.3 million
reviews. We measure several key characteristics at the heart of
the ongoing debate and the sharing economy. Among others, we
find that Airbnb has reached a global yet heterogeneous coverage.
The majority of its listings across many countries are entire homes,
suggesting that Airbnb is actually more like a rental marketplace
rather than a spare-room sharing platform. Analysis on star-ratings
reveals that there is a bias toward positive ratings, amplified by a
bias toward using positive words in reviews. The extent of such
bias is greater than Yelp reviews, which were already shown to
exhibit a positive bias. We investigate a key issue—commercial
hosts who own multiple listings on Airbnb—repeatedly discussed
in the current debate. We find that their existence is prevalent, they
are early-movers towards joining Airbnb, and their listings are
disproportionately entire homes and located in the US. Our work
advances the current understanding of how Airbnb is being used
and may serve as an independent and empirical reference to inform
the debate.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a proliferation of online peer-to-peer mar-
ketplaces [10]. Examples abound and the services covered range
from personal loans (Prosper, LendingClub, SocietyOne) and ride
(Uber, Lyft) to household tasks (TaskRabbit) and accommodations
(Airbnb). Enabled by the Internet and information technology, these
marketplaces aim to match sellers who are willing to share under-
utilized goods or services with buyers who need them [3, 29]. Such
marketplaces are thus often referred to as examples of the so-called
“sharing economy” [6, 25, 33]. Airbnb, a primary example of this
type of marketplaces, connects hosts who have spare rooms with
guests who need accommodations. Founded in 2008, it now has
more than two million listings located in more than 191 countries,
and has accumulated more than 60 million guests.1
Accompanied by its rapid growth, Airbnb has confronted intense
debates, regulatory challenges, and battles. Advocates argue that
the platform enables many householders to become small business
owners and reduce their rental burden. It may also make travelers
pay less than hotel prices and have a more local and authentic
experience, exemplified by its slogan “live there.” Opponents argue
that many hosts rent their entire homes for short-terms, which
is illegal in many cities [17, 30, 31]. This usage also involves two
other critical issues. First, entire homes that are used for short-term
rentals on Airbnb may be taken down from local housing markets,
which may drive the rents up. A recent study, however, suggested
that this might not be the case [32]. Second, the coming-in of more
travelers may be disruptive to residential neighborhoods. Another
argument from opponents is that some hosts who own a large
number of listings may be operating business on Airbnb but may
fail to fulfill their tax obligations. This gives them advantages over
hotels and makes them “free riders,” because accommodation taxes
collected from hotels are often used for tourism promotions that
benefit all accommodation suppliers [17].
Although much debated, to what extent the discussed arguments
are empirically grounded remains to be seen. To this end, here we
present the first large-scale data-driven study on Airbnb, focusing
on the entire market. By measuring key characteristics directly
related to these arguments, we paint a more complete yet compli-
cated picture of Airbnb. First, regrading the issue of short-term
rentals of entire homes, we document that across many countries,
entire homes account for the majority of listings; 68.5% of all list-
ings are entire homes and only 29.8% are private rooms. Although
we do not further quantify the extent to which they are used for
short-term rentals—a limitation of our work—simply due to the
unavailability of proprietary data from Airbnb on listing bookings,
we note that the statistics of room types have changed from 2012
when 57% are entire homes and 41% are private rooms [17]. This
1https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us
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Table 1: Statistics of our data set about Airbnb
Countries 193
Listings
Active 2, 018, 747
Unavailable 284, 039
Total 2, 302, 786
Users
Hosts 1, 313, 626
Guests 11, 150, 017
Total 12, 156, 178∗
Reviews 19, 377, 978
Note: ∗ 307, 465 users are both hosts and guests
change suggests that Airbnb has been becoming more like a rental
marketplace rather than a spare-room sharing platform. Moreover,
listings owned by business operators may more likely be rented in
short-terms, compared with other ordinary hosts.
Second, regarding the issue of business operators, we character-
ize in a great detail who they are and what their listings are. Our
results suggest a heavier usage from business operators than previ-
ously thought. The number of listings owned by a host is distributed
according to a power-law, spanning three orders of magnitude. One
third of all listings are owned by 9.4% of hosts, each of whom
has at least three listings, and one host even owns 1, 800 listings.
Furthermore, we show that business operators are early-movers
towards joining Airbnb and behave more professionally than or-
dinary hosts and that their listings are disproportionately of the
entire home type and located in the US. These results reinforce the
rental marketplace notion of Airbnb.
Third, our analysis reveals predominantly positive star-ratings
of listings, which is different from previously observed J-shaped
distribution. This positivity bias is consistent with a bias toward
using positive words in reviews, and the extent is greater than Yelp
reviews. These results may suggest that many guests had overall
positive experiences during their stays, corroborating advocates’
argument on traveler experiences. It can also indicate the presence
of selection bias in review behaviors [14]—only those who had great
experiences chose to give reviews.
Taken together, we believe that our work significantly advances
the current understanding of how Airbnb is being used. Our main
contributions in this work are:
• We crawl Airbnb listing data on a global scale. (§ 2)
• We analyze geolocations, room types, star-ratings, and
reviews of listings. (§ 3)
• We characterize hosts who ownmultiple listings on Airbnb
and those listings owned by them. (§ 4)
• We investigate factors linked to listings’ future rental per-
formance. (§ 5)
2 DATA
2.1 Data Collection
On Airbnb, each listing has a web page showing its details such as
room type, price, reviews from previous guests, host information,
etc. For example, the listing called “Van Gogh’s Bedroom” can be
visited at https://www.airbnb.com/rooms/10981658. The main goal
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Figure 1: Cumulative number of hosts.
of our data collection is to accumulate as many listings as possible,
so that we can perform a systematic analysis. There are two steps
in the data collection process: (1) accumulating listing IDs; and (2)
downloading their HTML files and reviews. We describe them in
detail below, and before that, let us present in Table 1 some summary
statistics about the collected data set. To our best knowledge, these
are the first public and exact statistics about the Airbnbmarketplace.
In the first step, we accumulated listing IDs by exploiting the
hierarchical structure of the Airbnb site map, which has three levels:
country, regions in the country, and search results of listings in
the region. The top level at /sitemaps lists 152 countries, each of
which has a hyperlink pointing to the web page that lists regions
in the country. All the regions in Australia, for example, are listed
at /sitemaps/AU. Each region, again, has a hyperlink pointing
to the page of search results of listings in the region. Our script
followed all these hyperlinks and obtained 83, 174 regions in 152
countries. Then for each region, our script visited its search page
and saved all the listing IDs there. We repeated this search process
7 times, with each new search resulting in a smaller number of
new IDs. The only constraint stopping us from more searches is
the availability of computing and storage resources. In total, we
accumulated 2, 302, 786 unique listings.
In the second step, for each listing, our script visited its web
page, saved the HTML file, and collected all the reviews. As we are
also interested in rental performances of listings, we repeated this
step 3 times—after the 1st, 2nd, and 7th search. The statistics in
Table 1 and the analyses presented in § 3 and § 4 are based on the
latest crawl. We found 284, 039 (12.3%) listings were unavailable,
by which we mean visiting them redirected to a search page with a
message saying “the listing is no longer available.” As an example,
see /rooms/11599049.
The entire data collection process was performed between May
and September, 2016. Note that we followed the crawler-etiquette
described in Airbnb’s robots.txt:2 None of the three directories
we visited—/sitemaps, /s/, and /rooms/{listing ID}—are spec-
ified as disallowed in the file.
2.2 Summary Statistics Analysis
We compare the statistics in Table 1 with official ones. The only
official but approximate numbers we found were already mentioned
in § 1: 191+ countries, 2M+ listings, and 60M+ total guests. Our
obtained number of countries and listings seem to be comparable
2https://www.airbnb.com/robots.txt
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Figure 2: Geolocations of Airbnb listings. (a) Dot plot of all the 2,018,747 active listings; (b–c) Histogram of longitude and lati-
tude; (d–g) Dot plot of listings in the city of Los Angeles, New York, London, and Barcelona. See Appendix A for the copyright
of city maps.
to official ones. We note, however, that the number of guests (11M)
is much smaller than the official one (60M). One obvious reason is
that here we have only counted those guests who have left at least
one review captured in our data set but not every guest has given
reviews.
Next, we provide estimations of some statistics that are still
unknown or may be outdated. First, 307, 465 users are both hosts
and guests, accounting for 23.4% of all hosts, counted based on
the observation that they own listings and give reviews to other
listings. This gives one answer to the Quora question.3 Second,
Fig. 1 presents the cumulative number of hosts in each month
from March 2008 to August 2016, constructed using the month
information that indicates when they joined Airbnb. We see that an
exponential growth of number of hosts started from around 2012.
Third, we make an estimate of an important statistic—the guest-to-
host review rate—meaning the fraction of stays where guests have
left reviews to their hosts after the conclusion of their stays. We
approximate it as
guest-to-host review rate = # stays with reviews left# total stays
≈ 19, 102, 711102, 718, 148 = 18.6%.
(1)
Here the number of stays with reviews left is simply the number
of reviews (excluding automatic reviews, cf. § 3.4), and the total
number of stays is estimated by extrapolating the distribution of
3https://www.quora.com/What-percentage-of-Airbnb-hosts-are-also-guests
number of reviews per guest showed in Fig. 5(a) from the 11M
guests to the entire population of 60M guests. Our estimate has
already been significantly smaller than the reported 72% in 2012 by
Airbnb’s CEO Brian Chesky.4 It remains to be seen how accurate
our estimation is and how the one disclosed in early days is different
from the one nowadays.
3 MEASURING AIRBNB LISTINGS
3.1 Geolocations
Let us start with where Airbnb listings are located—a question re-
peatedly asked by hoteliers, policy-makers, and other stakeholders
(e.g., [30]). Using each listing’s approximate geolocation informa-
tion in latitude/longitude values provided by Airbnb, we present in
Fig. 2(a) a dot plot showing geolocations of all active listings across
the world. We see that listings are globally distributed. To under-
stand their geographic concentration, Figs. 2(b) and (c) respectively
show the histograms of longitude and latitude values. We observe
that, on the continental level, listings are heavily located in West-
ern Europe, North America, East and South Asia, and Pacific Asia.
Focusing on the country level, Airbnb has reached a world-wide
yet heterogeneous coverage. US is the largest market for Airbnb,
with 308, 714 listings totaling for 15.29% of all listings, followed by
France (11.82%), Italy (10.07%), Spain (6.16%), and United Kingdom
(3.93%). Figure 3(b) lists the top 30 countries, which in total account
for 83.55% of all listings. Meanwhile, many countries have only
4https://www.quora.com/What-percent-of-Airbnb-hosts-leave-reviews-for-their-
guests/answer/Brian-Chesky?srid=uU9cX
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Figure 3: Room types of Airbnb listings. (a) Distribution of room types of all active listings; (b) Number of listings by room
type in the top 30 countries with the highest number of listings. Countries with smaller number of entire homes than private
rooms are marked red; (c) Distribution of the ratio between entire homes and private rooms in countries with high, medium,
and low number of listings.
hundreds of listings, and there are no listings in a lot of African
countries.
Focusing on cities, Figs. 2(d)–(g) respectively display locations of
listings in the city of Los Angeles, New York, London, and Barcelona.
As here we are interested in the global distribution, we leave the
detailed study of how listings are located within cities as future
work. Some studies have done so focusing on London [28] and
Barcelona [16].
3.2 Room Types
Next, we study the distribution of the three types of rooms of
Airbnb listings: entire home/apartment, private room, and shared
room. As suggested by their names, entire home means that the
host will not be present in the home during one’s stay; private room
means that the guest will occupy a private bedroom and share other
spaces with others; and shared room means the guest will share the
bedroom with other guests. While the latter two types of listings
may align with the symbolism of the sharing economy that hosts
occasionally share their spare rooms, it is the type of entire home
that (1) directly contrasts with such symbolism; and (2) becomes
the necessary condition for hosts to convert residential houses into
short-term rentals and for business operators to conduct business by
renting out their numerous properties. Hosts who use entire homes
in such ways have become one of the main targets of regulations in
some cities. For instance, the New York State Legislature recently
passed a bill that subjects hosts to fines when they rent their entire
homes for less than thirty days,5 and the bill was recently signed
by New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo.6 The statistics about
room types are therefore among the key characteristics mentioned
in many reports by various interest groups (e.g., [30]), yet they are
still unknown at the entire-marketplace level.
5http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/06/17/new-york-wants-to-fine-
airbnb-hosts-up-to-7500
6http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/technology/new-york-passes-law-airbnb.html
Figure 3(a) shows that on the entire market, 68.5% of listings
are entire homes, while only 29.8% are private rooms; Airbnb has
1.3 times more entire homes than private rooms. These statistics
are in contrast with the ones back in 2012 when 57% were entire
homes and 41%were private rooms [17]. Such change indicates that
Airbnb, a primary example of the “sharing economy,” is more like a
rental marketplace rather than a spare-room sharing platform.
We investigate variations of the room type distribution across
countries. Figure 3(b) shows the number of the three types of listings
in the top 30 countries with the largest number of listings. Among
them, 27 countries have more entire homes than private rooms. In
the US, which has the largest number of listings, 65.8% are entire
rooms, and the ratio between number of entire homes and private
rooms reaches 2. The only three countries or regions where there
are more private rooms than entire homes are Taiwan (0.57), India
(0.91), and Ireland (0.96), though the ratio is close to one for the
latter two countries. We further calculate the ratio for each of the
150 countries with more than 100 listings (Countries with small
number of listings have large fluctuations of the ratio.), and show
in Fig. 3(c) the distributions of the ratio for the three equally-sized
groups of countries, based on their total number of listings. We see
that the ratio is greater than one across many countries and even
larger for countries with smaller number of listings.
3.3 Star-ratings
We now focus on star-ratings and reviews, which are the reputation
system of Airbnb and important sources of information for guests
to pick listings [24]. At the conclusion of each stay, both the host
and guest can give reviews to and rate each other at a scale from 1
to 5 stars with a unit of 0.5 star. Each listing will receive an average
star-rating once it is rated by at least 3 guests.7 The star-rating of
each individual review, however, is not publicly disclosed.
7https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1257/how-do-star-ratings-work
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Figure 4: Distribution of star-ratings.
Figure 4(a) shows a bimodal distribution of star-ratings over all
listings. More than half of them (54.6%) have not received their
ratings, and 40.6% have 4.5 or 5 stars. These three categories of
listings account for over 95% of all listings, and the number of
listings with 3.5 or lower stars is essentially negligible. Focusing on
listings that have received star-ratings, Fig. 4(a) inset shows that
star-ratings are overwhelmingly positive; 89.5% of them have 4.5
or 5 stars, and the mean (median) rating is 4.67 (4.5). These results
are consistent with a previous small-scale study [35]. However,
this heavily skewed distribution is sightly different from previously
observed J-shaped distribution of product reviews [18]. In particular,
such distribution suggests that the number of 1-star products is
high, which is not the case for Airbnb listings.
We explore variations of this distribution by room type. Fig-
ures 4(b)–(d) respectively show the star-rating distributions of en-
tire homes, private rooms, and shared rooms. Although, for shared
rooms, 4.5-star listings are of a higher fraction than 5-star listings,
there is very limited variation of the distribution: The majority
of listings, irrespective of room type, have either no or very high
ratings. This, on the one hand, suggests that many guests had great
experiences during their stays, but makes star-ratings less informa-
tive and distinguishable for future guests to choose among potential
listings, on the other.
3.4 Reviews
There are 19, 377, 978 reviews given by 11, 150, 017 guests. We are
aware that Airbnb will post an automatic review if a host cancels a
reservation, serving as one penalty for the cancellation.8 We find
275, 267 automatic reviews, amounting to 1.4% of all reviews. This
provides an upper bound of the cancellation rate by hosts, as not
every stay yields a review.We removed all automatic reviews before
further analysis.
3.4.1 Distribution of Review Counts. On the Airbnb review sys-
tem, which is different from others like Yelp, only guests who con-
cluded their stays can give reviews. This makes the number of
8https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/314/why-did-i-get-a-review-that-says-i-
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Figure 5: Review counts on Airbnb. (a) Distribution of num-
ber of reviews per listing and guest; (b) Number of reviews
of listings with different host ages.
reviews a listing has received a proxy of its business attention, al-
though the review rate and number of stayed nights associated with
each review may be different. Therefore, we analyze how reviews
are distributed among listings, showing in Fig. 5(a) the survival
distribution. We shift it by one to make the zero-review data point
visible in the logarithmic scale. We see that although Airbnb is a
relatively young marketplace, reviews have already been hetero-
geneously distributed among listings. About 35.7% listings do not
have reviews, and respectively 12.2% and 7.4% listings have one
and two reviews. The remaining 44.6% listings, each of which has
at least three reviews, account for 93.6% reviews. In § 5, we demon-
strate the presence of the rich-get-richer mechanism in explaining
the growth of reviews.
We next analyze the relation between listing age and number of
reviews. As we do not know when each listing was established, nor
do we know when each and every review was given, we use the
Airbnb age of its host—the number of months passed since they
joined Airbnb—as a proxy of the listing age. Focusing on listings
with at least one review, Fig. 5(b) shows the 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentile of number of reviews of listings grouped by host age.
We observe that (1) the number of reviews in general increases
with host ages; (2) even for hosts who joined Airbnb for years, the
median number of reviews still remains in the order of ten; and (3)
the review count is heterogeneously distributed even for hosts who
joined Airbnb in the same month.
Figure 5(a) also shows a heavy-tailed distribution of number of
reviews per guest. Respectively 66.3% and 17.8% guests have given
one and two reviews, while only 0.63% guests have left at least 10
reviews.
3.4.2 Review Content. We start investigating text content of
reviews with what languages are used. Using the langdetect lan-
guage detection library,9 we found 49 languages used. Table 2 re-
ports the percentages of reviews written in the top 10 most used
languages. English dominates this ranking, with 72.8% of reviews
using it, followed by French, Spanish, German, and Italian. From
now on, we focus on the 14, 094, 229 English reviews.
Positive/Negative words: Recall that a vast majority (89.5%)
of listings have 4.5 or 5 stars (Fig. 4(a) inset). This raises the ques-
tion of whether this strongly skew toward positive star-ratings is
9https://pypi.python.org/pypi/langdetect
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Table 2: Top 10 languages used in reviews
Language % Language %
English 72.8 Chinese (Simplified) 1.6
French 10.3 Korean 1.3
Spanish 3.8 Portuguese 1.0
German 3.5 Dutch 0.9
Italian 2.3 Russian 0.9
consistent with a usage bias toward positive vocabulary. To answer
this, we use a recently released resource that contains norms of
almost 14K English words [34], each of which has a valence score
from 1 to 9, where valence greater than 5 means positive words
and smaller than 5 negative words. We calculate the ratio of the
frequency of positive and negative words in Airbnb reviews. To
compare the skewness, we also calculate the ratio for 2.7M Yelp
reviews.10 Table 3 shows that the ratio doubles for Airbnb reviews.
This confirms a bias toward using positive words, and the extent is
even greater than reviews on Yelp, which already exhibits a positive
bias [20]. Given that Airbnb is a P2P platform where hosts can also
choose which guests to accommodate, this finding may open up
further investigations into user behaviors on different platforms.
4 MEASURING MULTI-LISTING HOSTS
In this section, we investigate a key issue repeatedly discussed in
the current debate—the existence of hosts who ownmultiple listings
on Airbnb. Hereafter, we call them “multi-listers.” Note that they
may have different names in various reports, such as “commercial
hosts,” “professional hosts,” and “business operators,” all attempting
to capture the possibility that they may operate business on Airbnb,
as an ordinary host is less likely to own numerous listings. Despite
being a critical issue, there has been no systematic analysis about
multi-listers and their listings.
4.1 Existence of Multi-listers
Recall that there are 2, 018, 747 active listings owned by 1, 313, 626
hosts (Table 1), thus on average every host owns 1.54 listings. Fig-
ure 6(a) shows the survival distribution of number of owned listings
per host. We observe a somewhat surprising heavy-tailed distribu-
tion that spans more than three orders of magnitude, similar to what
have been observed in many complex systems [1]. We fit the empir-
ical distribution with a power-law function p(x) = α−1xmin
(
x
xmin
)−α
using the methods developed in refs [2, 4], and obtain α = 2.65 and
xmin = 15. These results not only demonstrate the existence of “su-
per multi-listers”—hosts who can own up to 1, 800 listings, but also
indicate that the existence of multi-listers is prevalent. Simply put,
although the vast majority of hosts have a small number of listings,
there is a consistent number of hosts who own a large number of
listings. In particular, 1, 030, 134 (78.4%) and 159, 627 (12.2%) hosts
respectively own one and two listings, and the remaining 9.43%
hosts own 33.16% of all listings.
To further characterize multi-listers and their listings, we need
to answer a key question—which threshold of number of owned
10https://www.yelp.com/dataset_challenge/
Table 3: Ratio of frequency of positive and negative words
used in Airbnb and Yelp reviews
Airbnb reviews Yelp reviews
Ratio 13.749 6.705
listings per host allows us to separate hosts into two groups and then
compare them. Previous literature have not reached a consensus
about this. The New York State Attorney General, for example,
defined “commercial hosts” as those who have three or more unique
listings [30]. Li et al. defined “professional hosts” as those who have
two or more listings [23]. Here, we argue that a typical threshold
value may not be well-defined, as Fig. 6(a) clearly suggests that the
number of owned listings is a multi-scale phenomenon. Moreover,
as we shall show, focusing on a particular value loses the whole
picture and can even be misleading.
Instead, we simply increase the threshold and study how various
measures of interest change accordingly. Specifically, for a given
threshold, we characterize (1) the subset of hosts whose number
of owned listings exceeds the given threshold; and (2) the subset of
listings owned by those hosts. If the threshold is zero, we simply
focus on all hosts and all listings.
4.2 Listings Owned by Multi-listers
Figures 6(b)–(e) present the characterization results for listings
owned by multi-listers. Figure 6(b) shows the percentages of list-
ings in 5 countries, United States (US), Spain (ES), Croatia (HR),
Italy (IT), and Australia (AU), selected because they have the largest
number of listings when the threshold is 20. We observe that as
we increase the threshold, listings owned by multi-listers are dis-
proportionately located in the US. We also see that a decreasing
portion of listings are from Italy, while Spain and Croatia have an
increasing portion. Figure 6(b) (and Fig. 6(d)) also illustrates why
focusing on a particular threshold can be misleading. For exam-
ple, if one focused on a particular value (1 or 2), one would have
concluded that the number of US listings owned by multi-listers is
proportional to total listings in the US, which is not the case.
Figure 6(c) focuses on how the total number of listings and
number of reviews received by them change as we increase the
threshold. We observe a faster decrease of review counts, indicating
that the average number of reviews per listing decreases. When the
threshold is 0, on average a listing has 9.6 reviews, which decreases
to 2.6 when the threshold reaches 20. Therefore, listings owned by
multi-listers are less reviewed.
Figure 6(d) shows that an increasing portion of listings are entire
homes as the threshold increases. When the threshold is 20, more
than 92% of listings are entire homes, compared to 68.5% on the en-
tire market. This confirms the previous conjecture that commercial
hosts seek to rent out their entire home properties.
Figure 6(e) answers the question of how far away the listings
owned by a single host. Using listings’ latitude/longitude values, we
calculate, for each host, the maximum distance among all pairwise
distances between two of their listings, capturing the geographical
diameter of their “managerial” activities. Figure 6(e) shows that
the median of the distribution of maximum distance over all hosts
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Figure 6: Characterizing multi-listers and their listings. (a) Survival distribution of number of owned listings per host. From
(b) to (h), we focus on (1) the subset of hosts whose number of owned listings exceeds a threshold; and (2) the subset of listings
owned by those hosts, and show how various measures change as we increase the threshold. (b) Percentage of listings located
in 5 countries; (c) Number of listings and their total reviews; (d) Percentage of entire homes; (e) Themedian of the distribution
of the maximum distance between pairs of listings owned by a host; (f) Mean Airbnb age of hosts; (g) Percentage of hosts who
give descriptions; (h) Percentage of hosts whose profile photos have facial features.
whose number of listings exceeds a given threshold, though keeps
increasing, is in the order of 10km. This suggests that listings owned
by multi-listers may locate within a city and that they may operate
business locally.
4.3 Multi-listers
Figures 6(f)–(h) show the characterization results for multi-listers.
First, Fig. 6(f) demonstrates that multi-listers are early-movers to-
wards joining Airbnb, as their mean Airbnb age is larger than other
hosts.
Figure 6(g) focuses on the percentages of hosts who give de-
scriptions in the space-limited “Your Host” section on listings’ web
pages. Presenting self-description is one important way to establish
trust between guests and hosts. Surprisingly, only 47.3% of all hosts
have given descriptions (threshold 0), and multi-listers are more
likely to do so. Using the method described in ref. [26] and set-
ting the threshold to 10, we find the top 10 overrepresented words
used in multi-listers’ descriptions are “https,” “vacation,” “wildschö-
nau,” “properties,” “rentals,” “team,” “villas,” “rental,” “apartments,”
and “services,” indicating that they use the description section to
advertise their listings.
Figure 6(h) examines another way to establish trust—showing
faces in profile photos. Using a service provided by Face++ to detect
whether there are facial features presented in a given photo,11 we
find that for 69.5% of all hosts, there are faces detected in their
profile photos. Multi-listers are less likely to show faces in their
11http://www.faceplusplus.com/detection_detect/
photos, and a manual inspection reveals that many of them use
company’s logos as profile photos.
5 MODELING REVIEW GROWTH
In the last section, we have found notable differences between
multi-listers and other hosts. This raises the question of whether
the differences are linked to listings’ future rental performances.
To answer this, we approximate performances with number of new
reviews, as we do not know listings’ actual booked nights. For each
listing, we calculate the number of new reviews it has received in
one month, which is our response variable. The first two columns
in Table 4 list predictors and their definitions. Instant Book is a
listing feature, meaning that a potential guest can book the listing
without the host’s approval.12 The superhost badge is awarded
to a host if they satisfies a series of requirements set by Airbnb.13
Response time of a host is transformed into numerical values, so
that a faster response corresponds to a larger value.
We fit a linear regression model by ordinary least squares (OLS)
to understand factors linked to the growth of reviews. The last
column in Table 4 presents the regression results. Other predictors
being the same, listings with more existing reviews will have more
new reviews, demonstrating the presence of the rich-get-richer
mechanism that has been found to explain the growth of numerous
systems [27]. Listings whose ratings have one more star will have
0.169more review. A private roomwill gain 0.112more review than
12https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/187/what-is-instant-book
13https://www.airbnb.com/superhost
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Table 4: Regression results for monthly new reviews
reviews Number of reviews 0.037∗∗∗
(0.0001)
ratinд Star-rating 0.169∗∗∗
(0.001)
room_type Room type
private 0.112∗∗∗
(0.003)
shared −0.091∗∗∗
(0.011)
amenities # available amenities 0.017∗∗∗
(0.0003)
instant_book Instant book is allowed
1 0.272∗∗∗
(0.003)
photos Number of photos −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001)
host_aдe Host age −0.018∗∗∗
(0.0001)
host_super Host is a superhost
1 0.259∗∗∗
(0.005)
host_desp Host gives descriptions
1 0.040∗∗∗
(0.003)
host_resp_rate Host response rate 0.229∗∗∗
(0.013)
host_resp_time Host response time 0.220∗∗∗
(0.002)
host_nlistinд # owned listings −0.001∗∗∗
(0.00002)
Constant −0.446∗∗∗
(0.011)
Observations 1,140,488
Adjusted R2 0.388
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
an entire home, while a shared room will have 0.091 less review
than an entire home. A listing that can be instantly booked will
have 0.272more review than those without the Instant Book feature.
Being a superhost, giving descriptions, maintaining high response
rate, responding in short time, and owning a smaller number of
listings all have positive effects on review growth, though the effect
is small for the number of owned listings.
6 RELATEDWORK
There is a growing interest in Airbnb and other sharing economy
platforms from diverse disciplines, ranging from computer science
to economics to law. Empirical studies have focused on, for exam-
ple, star-ratings of listings [35] and geolocations of listings within
cities [16, 28]. Our focus here is the entire Airbnb platform. There
are studies that have reported the presence of discrimination on
Airbnb [8, 9]. Some work have investigated factors associated with
listings’ price, such as the receipt of star-ratings [15] and race [21]
and personal photos [11] of their hosts. The impact of Airbnb on
hotel industry revenue [36, 37] and on tourism industry employ-
ment [12] has been investigated. Discussions about regulations of
Airbnb have also generated much attention [5, 7]. Li et al. inves-
tigated differences in performances and behaviors between pro-
fessional hosts—those who own two or more listings—and non-
professional hosts on Airbnb [23]. Our analysis, however, reveals
the lack of threshold that allows us to separate professional and non-
professional hosts. Studies focusing on the motivations behind join-
ing Airbnb to provide hospitality have pointed out that monetary
compensation and sociability are two important aspects [19, 22].
Fradkin et al. experimentally investigated the determinants and
bias in the Airbnb review system [14]. Fradkin proposed ranking
algorithms for the Airbnb search engine [13].
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we have presented the first large-scale data-driven
study on Airbnb. After crawling the largest ever number of Airbnb
listings, we have measured their geolocations, room types, star-
ratings, and reviews. We have also characterized in a great detail
hosts who own multiple listings as well as their listings. We have
built a linear regression model to understand factors linked to the
growth of reviews. As these aspects are among the key points
discussed in the ongoing debate and among important features in
the sharing economy, we believe that our work provides valuable
insights for various stakeholders and may serve as a public and
empirical reference to inform the debate.
One major limitation of our work is that we do not measure
listing occupancy. Therefore we do not know towhat extent a listing
is rented in short-terms or what revenue differences are between
multi-listers and ordinary hosts. We notice that it is feasible to
crawl listing calendar data. However, one issue of using such data is
that, given a listing is unavailable on some dates, we cannot tell if it
is rented out or simply blocked by the host for not renting. Another
technical challenge is to large-scale monitor the calender data on a
daily basis. Future work may do so on a small scale. Other future
work include studying geolocation at a finer level, measuring hosts’
behavioral changes, and understanding the effect of review content
on listings’ future rentals.
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